BRICS New Delhi Declaration: India Secured Consensus. The Harder Test Is What Comes Next

NEW DELHI — The most consequential question emerging from the 18th BRICS Summit may not be what the grouping agreed to in New Delhi, but what it can carry forward after India’s chairship ends.

BRICS leaders adopted the New Delhi Declaration by consensus on September 12, bringing together 11 members around a 140-paragraph document covering global governance, international financial institutions, trade, cross-border payments, artificial intelligence, development and international security. The declaration was adopted on the first day of the September 12–13 summit.

But India’s own presentation of the summit pointed to the difficulty ahead. Prime Minister Narendra Modi proposed a BRICS Continuity and Implementation Mechanism, to operate through the grouping’s Troika of past, present and incoming chairs. He argued that the annual change in presidency should not interrupt institutional momentum and proposed a digital repository tracking decisions, nodal points, timelines and implementation status.

That proposal provides perhaps the clearest lens through which to read the New Delhi Declaration: BRICS has become better at reaching consensus; its next challenge is demonstrating that consensus can produce continuity and results. Consensus was itself an outcome The agreement in New Delhi came after a year in which consensus had not always been easy. The declaration records more than 400 meetings and engagements across 30 Indian cities during the 2026 chairship. Yet the summit also exposed the limits of agreement among an expanded grouping.

Differences over West Asia had complicated earlier BRICS discussions. Reuters reported on September 12 that Iran and the UAE ultimately backed a joint statement calling for restraint, after negotiations over the language.

The final declaration reflects that balancing act. On the Middle East, BRICS leaders expressed deep concern over escalating tensions and called for maximum restraint, while the text did not single out individual states in the way a more unified political statement might have done.

The significance of the New Delhi document, therefore, lies partly in what its members were able to say together despite differences over major geopolitical questions. It also lies in what they could not agree on.

A familiar demand: a greater voice in global institutions

The first major pillar of the declaration is institutional reform. BRICS reaffirmed its support for a more representative and accountable international system and called for reforms to global governance. The declaration also backed the aspirations of Brazil and India for a greater role at the United Nations, including the Security Council.

The language continues a position that has appeared in previous BRICS declarations. It strengthens the political case for greater representation of emerging economies, but it does not by itself change the composition of the UN Security Council. That distinction matters. For BRICS, declarations are a way of establishing a common negotiating position. Institutional change, however, requires decisions outside the grouping and agreement among a much wider set of states.

India therefore used the summit not only to press for representation, but also to propose a more structured roadmap for global governance reform. Modi called for 10 proposals that could eventually form a BRICS reform roadmap. The next question is whether those proposals acquire a negotiating mechanism, timetable and identifiable institutional targets.

The financial system is another test of influence

The declaration also pushes for greater representation for developing economies in international financial institutions. BRICS leaders called for implementation of quota increases agreed under the 16th General Review of Quotas at the IMF and backed further realignment under the 17th Review. They also called for changes to the governance of the World Bank to address the underrepresentation of developing economies.

At the WTO, the declaration supports restoring a functioning dispute-settlement system, including new appointments to the Appellate Body, while also supporting the accession bids of Ethiopia and Iran. These positions fit the broader BRICS argument that international institutions should better reflect the distribution of economic power in the 21st century. But again, the declaration does not itself possess the authority to implement those institutional changes. The distinction between collective political weight and institutional power is central to understanding BRICS.

Payments: ambition without a common currency

The payments agenda is perhaps the clearest example. BRICS continues to explore greater use of local currencies and interoperability between national payment systems. The New Delhi Declaration asks the Payment Task Force to continue studying interoperability and local-currency settlements, while explicitly recognising that there is “no one-size-fits-all approach”.

India’s position also provides an important qualification to the broader debate around de-dollarisation. External Affairs Ministry officials said after the summit that there was no proposal for a common BRICS currency, while discussions on local-currency settlements would continue. That makes the immediate story less dramatic than some of the rhetoric surrounding BRICS payments.

The practical question is not whether BRICS will suddenly create a replacement for the dollar. It is whether its members can make bilateral and cross-border transactions in national currencies easier, cheaper and more interoperable. That is a much narrower and more measurable test.

Economic weight does not automatically create integration

BRICS has considerable economic scale. The New Development Bank reports $42.9 billion in approved financing across 139 projects, based on exchange rates as of December 31, 2025. BRICS economies also represented close to 40% of global output in purchasing-power-parity terms in 2024, compared with about 28% for the G7, according to IMF-based figures cited in the original analysis.

But economic weight and economic integration are not interchangeable. The grouping brings together economies with different trade structures, monetary systems, geopolitical priorities and relationships with the United States and other major markets.

The New Delhi Declaration expands the agenda of cooperation. Whether it deepens economic integration will depend on what happens to the mechanisms behind that agenda.

Security exposes the limits of consensus

The declaration is more revealing when read for what it leaves unresolved. Ukraine is absent from the peace and security section, with the text instead relying on a general call for disputes to be resolved through dialogue and diplomacy. On West Asia, the language is similarly calibrated. The declaration expresses concern and calls for restraint while accommodating the respective national positions of members. The treatment of terrorism is more specific.

The declaration condemns the April 22, 2025 terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, in which 26 people were killed, and calls for zero tolerance towards terrorism and an end to double standards in counterterrorism.

The contrast illustrates a broader feature of BRICS diplomacy: consensus is easier where members can identify a sufficiently broad common position. It becomes harder when an issue directly intersects with competing strategic relationships.

AI and digital infrastructure could provide a more practical test

Technology may offer BRICS an area in which political declarations can be converted more readily into institutional cooperation.

The New Delhi Declaration supports a digital public infrastructure repository, pilot deployments among members and implementation of the BRICS statement on AI governance. It also addresses intellectual-property concerns surrounding material used to train AI systems.

This is significant because digital public infrastructure is an area where India has sought to position its domestic experience as a potential model for other developing economies. But the same implementation question applies.

A repository, pilot programme or framework is an output. Its value will ultimately depend on whether members adopt it, connect their systems to it, fund it and maintain it.

The institutional test India has now set for BRICS

This is where India’s proposed Continuity and Implementation Mechanism becomes important. The proposal would use the Troika of the previous, current and incoming chairs to follow up on initiatives. Modi also proposed a secure digital repository that could record the responsible institution, timeline and implementation status for each decision.

The proposal effectively acknowledges a structural weakness in a system where the chair changes annually: priorities can change faster than institutions can deliver them. The declaration itself recognises the need for “outcome oriented enhanced coordination, continuity and support for a long-term institutional development” and welcomes further work on institutional development and an online archival database. That makes implementation no longer merely an outside critique of BRICS. It is now part of the grouping’s own institutional agenda.

Beijing will provide the first test

China assumes the BRICS chairship in 2027 and will host the 19th summit. The New Delhi Declaration formally extends support to China for the next chairship. The transition will provide an immediate test of whether India's proposals for continuity can survive a change in leadership.

Four indicators will be worth watching.

First, whether IMF quota reforms and the next review produce tangible movement on representation.

Second, whether the BRICS payments agenda moves from feasibility and interoperability discussions towards functioning cross-border arrangements.

Third, whether institutional mechanisms for newer members, including the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, are completed.

Fourth, whether the proposed Continuity and Implementation Mechanism acquires concrete terms of reference before the next chairship takes full effect.

These are more useful measures of the summit’s legacy than the number of paragraphs in the declaration or the number of meetings held during the chairship.

From summit language to institutional outcomes

The New Delhi Declaration demonstrates that an expanded BRICS can still produce a common document despite substantial differences among its members.That is not insignificant. But consensus is a starting point, not an outcome in itself.

India’s own chairship has therefore left BRICS with an unusually explicit question: can an annual summit mechanism evolve into an institution capable of carrying decisions from one presidency to the next? The answer will not be found in New Delhi.

It will be visible in the follow-up: in budgets, mechanisms, appointments, operational payment systems, implementation reports and decisions that survive the change of chair. The declaration has documented what BRICS can agree on in 2026.

The next presidency will begin to show what that agreement is actually capable of doing.

Debodipta Nandan is an independent public policy professional working at the intersection of digital governance and strategic communications. She writes on regulation, media, and emerging technology. Views expressed are personal.